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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The motor vehicle-train accident, though infrequent, is the most 
severe in terms of fatalities, personal injuries, and property damage per 
accident of all types experienced on American highways. This type of 
accident, however, can be eliminated only by closing all crossings to 
highway traffic or by constructing grade separations for all rail-highway 
crossings. The delay and congestion resulting from the first alternative 
obviously would not be tolerated by the motoring public. Based on an 
estimated cost of separation improvements in Ohio, it would cost $5 
billion to construct grade separations at the 10,800 grade crossings in 
Indiana. (4 )*
Another alternative is to install modern flashing lights with 
short-arm gates at all crossings. Such an undertaking is estimated to 
reduce the number of accidents by a considerable amount, but the 
cost would be in excess of $150 million. (4 ) This figure is more realistic 
but still represents an enormous sum of money. Furthermore, the 
expenditure of this amount of money might well be more efficiently 
used for the prevention of other types of accidents.
The national trend for rail-highway grade crossing accidents is 
decreasing, but the reverse is true in Indiana. Based on data compiled 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission at the close of 1953, the 
numbers of grade crossing accidents and fatalities in Indiana were 
among the highest in the nation. Indiana was exceeded only by 
Arkansas in grade crossing accidents per million cars registered and 
grade crossing deaths per million cars registered. (4)
* Numbers in parentheses refer to sources listed in the bibliography.
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During 1962 and 1963, 149 people were killed in motor vehicle- 
train accidents in Indiana. This figure accounts for 6.0 percent of the 
total highway fatalities but only 0.4 percent of the total number of 
accidents. ( 1 ) The severity of these accidents is of general concern 
to the public and is invariably well publicized.
The present warrants as specified by the Indiana State Highway 
Commission for the protection of highway-rail grade crossings are 
as follows:
a) “ Tw o or more main line tracks should be protected by flashing 
lights and short-arm gates;
b) Where train speeds are 70 mph or greater on single line tracks, 
flashing lights and short-arm gates should be used; and
c) All other crossings are protected by flashing lights except those 
where there is good sight distance in all quadrants and where 
either the highway traffic is less than 500 vehicles per day 
(A D T ), or rail traffic less than 6 trains per day (T P D ). These 
latter crossings are protected by reflectorized crossbucks and 
advance warning signs.” (3 )
These general warrants do not result in priority ratings based on hazard. 
The priority for improving crossing protection at rail-highway inter­
sections is left to subjective judgment.
In a recent report by the Interstate Commerce Commission based on 
data submitted by the railroads, Henry Vinskey concluded that the 
major cause of rail-highway grade crossing accidents is the failure of 
motor-vehicle drivers to yield to trains. (2 ) The purpose of this 
research study was to investigate existing conditions which might have 
encouraged drivers not to take reasonable precautions. This study con­
stitutes an analysis of highway-rail grade crossing accidents with respect 
to the effects of environment, crossing geometry, highway and rail traffic 
patterns, existing protective devices, and other relevant elements and 
their relative importance as a basis for determining a more effective 
and economic means of establishing the necessary railroad crossing 
protection. (5 )
PRO CED U RE
Because accident data were readily available for only two years, 
1962 and 1963, and so that more meaningful correlations could be 
developed, accident locations were compared to nonaccident locations. 
The 289 accident locations, which included most of the rural crossings 
in Indiana with at least one accident in 1962 and 1963, were estab­
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lished by using the traffic accident reports of the Indiana State Police. 
The 241 nonaccident locations were randomly selected throughout 
the state in proportion to the railroad mileage in each county.
The information for the study variables came primarily from three 
separate sources: police accident reports; field investigations; and rail­
road correspondence. A  total of 28 variables was considered in evaluat­
ing the effects of environment, topography, geometry, and highway 
and railroad traffic patterns on the safety of rail-highway grade crossings 
in rural areas. Only those variables which significantly influenced the 
hazard of grade crossings are presented in the Results section.
Multiple linear regression analysis was performed on the 28 varia­
bles common to both accident and nonaccident locations. The dependent 
variable was accident occurrence, a dichotomous variable representing 
occurrence or non-occurrence of an accident. The “ buildup” regression 
routine allowed the ordering of the independent variables to permit 
•the initial inclusion of preselected variables. For all equations, train 
and highway traffic volumes were ordered to permit their inclusion in 
the multiple regression expressions.
RESULTS
In an attempt to gain an insight into the characteristics of railroad­
highway grade crossing accidents, the following statistical summary 
was developed from the accident locations analyzed in this research 
investigation.
1. Driver characteristics.
a. Driver age— the average age of all drivers involved in a 
grade crossing accident was 36 years.
b. Driver sex— 86  percent of these drivers were male.
c. Driver residence— 72 percent of the drivers were from the 
county in which the accident occurred. Ninety-four percent 
of the drivers were residents of Indiana.
d. Number of occupants— the average number of occupants in 
accident vehicles was 1.36 persons per vehicle.
e. Drinking driver— only 6 percent of the accident reports indi­
cated that the driver had been drinking.
f. Personal injury— 62 percent of the accidents resulted in at 
least one personal injury.




a. Vehicle type— 27 percent of the accident vehicles were trucks.
b. Age of vehicle— the average age of vehicle involved in grade 
crossing accidents was 5.2 years.
c. Vehicle defects— 17 percent of the accident vehicles evidenced 
contributing mechanical defects.
d. Window position— 71 percent of the vehicles were considered 
to have had their windows rolled up at the time of the 
accident.
e. Actual car speed— the average of the reported car speeds of 
vehicles involved in accidents was 24 mph.
f. Actual train speed— the average of the reported speeds of 
trains involved in accidents was 41 mph.
3. Environmental characteristics.
a. Clear weather— 74 percent of the accidents occurred during’ 
clear weather.
b. Darkness— 36 percent of the accidents occurred at night.
c. Pavement surface moisture— pavements were dry 57 percent, 
wet 16 percent, and had ice or snow 27 percent of the time 
that accidents occurred.









An equation was developed to account for the various protection 
devices, train and highway volumes and those additional variables which 
significantly influenced accident occurrence. This analysis produced the 
following prediction equation:
1 . IH  =  +  0.149 —  0.376X29 —  0.300X3O —  0.383X3i
—  0.331X32 +  0.082X4O +  0.0223X4i +  0.011X 54 
+  0.0142X55 +  0.024X57
where IH =  index of hazard (accident occurrence),
X 29 =  presence of a painted crossbuck (0, 1),
X 30 =  presence of a reflectorized crossbuck ( 0 , 1 ),
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X 3i =  presence of a flasher ( 0 , 1 ),
X 32 =  presence of a gate ( 0 , 1 ),
X 40 =  number of track pairs,
X 41 =  pavement width in feet,
X 54 =  TP D ,
X 55 =  A D T/1000, and 
X 57 =  sum of distractions.
In addition to the protection variables, Equation 1 also includes 
variables which are measures of train and highway volumes. The type of 
rail and highway operations is represented by the variables designated 
as number of track pairs and pavement width. The number of roadside 
distractions which is the sum of the houses, businesses, and advertising 
signs per one-half mile on both sides of the roadway for one approach 
to the crossing, proved significant in this equation. The coefficient of 
determination for Equation 1 was 19.3 percent.
The regression coefficients of the four protective devices were 
remarkably similar. It might be inferred from, this fact that hazard was 
relatively independent of the type of protective device. T o  ascertain 
the statistical significance of the coefficients for the protection variables, 
a second multiple regression equation was developed which excluded 
the four types of crossing protection and included the remaining varia­
bles. The coefficient of determination for Equation 2, presented below, 
was 18.3 percent.
2. IH = 0.185 + 0.079X40 + O.O2 IX41 + O.OIIX54 + 0.013X55 
+  0.024X57
where IH  =  index of hazard,
X 40 =  number of track pairs,
X 41 =  pavement width in feet,
X 54 •= T P D ,
X 55 =  A D T/1000, and 
X 57 =  sum of distractions.
An F-test was performed on the multiple coefficients of determina­
tion for Equations 1 and 2 to test the hypothesis that the regression 
coefficients for the four protective devices as presented in Equation 2 
were not significantly different from zero. This hypothesis was not 
rejected at the 5-percent level of significance.
This analysis did not show that protection devices had a significant 
influence on the prediction of hazard at grade crossings. Although the 
protection device variables can be eliminated from the prediction equa­
tion, the result of this significance test does not warrant the conclusion 
that protection devices have no influence on reducing hazard. This
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finding is restricted by the limited variability of the field conditions for 
the four types of protection investigated. As an example, all high-volume 
roads were generally protected with flashers or gates, and all low-volume 
roads were protected primarily with crossbucks. Perhaps a before-and- 
after study at locations where changes in protection devices are made 
is necessary for such evaluation.
Because the inclusion of the protection variables did not materially 
improve the estimation of hazard and because the types of protection 
device were equally weighted, the nomograph shown as Figure 1 was 
developed from Equation 2. In an attempt to correlate the index of 
hazard with the present standards of installing protection devices at 
grade crossings in Indiana, the mean indices of hazard were calculated 
for the study crossings protected with reflectorized crossbucks, flashers, 
and gates. These mean values were, respectively, 0.523, 0.774, and
0.828. A  suggested warrant for the selection of at-grade protection was 
determined by computing the average value between the mean index 
of hazard for the various protection devices. Flashers would be war­
ranted if the index of hazard is greater than 0.65, and gates would be 
recommended for indices greater than 0.80. The values suggested for 
these warrants are based on current levels of protection. Painted 
crossbucks were not included in the nomograph because all crossbucks 
are required to be reflectorized by State law. Although many painted 
crossbucks are presently in service, these devices are to be replaced 
with reflectorized crossbucks when necessary.
The index of hazard and minimum protection warranted for the 
example shown on Figure 1 is determined in the following manner;
Given: T P D  =  6 ; A D T  =  4000; 2 track pairs; 20-ft pavement 
width; and 1 0  roadside distractions.
1. Draw a line extending from 6  trains per day through 4/1000 
A D T  to turning line A.
2. From the intersection point on line A, a line is drawn through 
2 track pairs and extended to turning line B.
3. From this point of intersection, a line is drawn through 20-ft 
pavement width and extended until it intersects turning line C.
4. After connecting this point on line C to the 10 roadside distrac­
tions, the index of hazard and minimum type of protection war­
ranted is found at the intersection of this line with the index 
of hazard scale.
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Fig. 1. Protection nomograph,
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CON CLU SION S
The following conclusions concerning hazard at railroad-highway 
grade crossings summarize the findings of this research investigation. 
As actual accident locations were compared to a random sample of 
non-accident locations, these results can reasonably be applied to all 
rural grade crossings within the State of Indiana.
1 . The accident victims are predominantly young male drivers 
residing in the county in which the accident occurred. They 
are usually traveling alone and not under the influence of 
alcohol. More than one half of them are injured, and about 
one out of seven is killed.
2. Trucks account for more than one quarter of the accident 
vehicles. Seventeen percent of all vehicles involved in accidents 
have evidence of mechanical defects. The possibility of the 
driver hearing a warning bell or train whistle is reduced because 
the windows are closed on most vehicles. The majority of 
accidents occur at relatively low car speeds and at moderate 
train speeds.
3. Most accidents occur during the favorable driving conditions of 
clear weather, daylight hours, and dry pavements. However, the 
number of accidents per unit time and per unit exposure is 
probably greater for ice and snow conditions and for wet pave­
ments than for dry pavement conditions.
4. The type of protection is not important as a variable in the 
equations developed by regression analysis for the prediction of 
index of hazard.
5. The regression equation developed by the multiple linear regres­
sion technique (Equation 2) identifies number of track pairs, 
highway pavement width, train volume, average daily traffic 
volume, and the sum of distractions (number of houses, busi­
nesses, and advertising signs) as important variables for the 
prediction of index of hazard. This equation explains 18 percent 
of the variation in accident occurrence.
6 . Warrants for the installation of protective devices at rail­
highway crossings, based on the current standard of protection 
used in Indiana, are hazard indices of below 0.65 for reflectorized 
crossbucks, 0.65 to 0.80 for flashers, and above 0.80 for gates.
7. This investigation of many roadway, railroad, traffic, and en­
vironmental variables permitted only an explanation of ap­
proximately 20 percent of accident occurrence. This finding
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lends support to the conclusion of many authors that railroad­
highway grade crossing accidents are predominantly the result 
of driver characteristics and/or chance.
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